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Abstract: The reliable early detection of oscillatory failure cases (OFC) for modern fly-by-wire
controlled civil aircraft is an important aspect in optimizing the structural design objectives for
reducing the environmental footprint of the aircraft. We propose a complete methodology for the
design of a model based fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) system, which allows the reliable
early detection of OFC characterized by low amplitude oscillations in a given frequency range.
The main factors for the achieved enhanced performance are: the accurate modelling of the
surface actuator via linear parameter-varying (LPV) models, an improved oscillation detection
by employing the recursive discrete Fourier transform, and the integrated tuning of the free
parameters of the FDD system using multi-objective optimization techniques.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The identification of an oscillatory failure case (OFC) for
a control surface is one of the best studied flight actuator
failure cases in the literature (see Goupil (2010b) and
references cited therein). The early detection of an OFC
is important to prevent high loads and for taking into
account stringent structural design objectives (Goupil,
2010b; Alcorta-Garcia et al., 2011). Two types of OFCs
are usually considered. The so-called liquid failure is an
additive oscillatory fault signal inside the actuator posi-
tioning control loop. The solid failure involves an oscil-
latory signal which completely replaces a normal signal
in the actuator positioning loop. According to Goupil
(2010b), the relevant frequency range for the OFC is 0.1-
10 Hz. The fault identification challenge for OFC is the
need of an early detection, which imposes short detection
times corresponding to a few oscillation periods. Another
challenge is the detection of small amplitude oscillations of
the control surfaces in the presence of measurement noise
of comparable magnitudes. Finally, the fault detection and
identification performance must be robustly achieved over
the whole flight envelope, for various pilot maneuvers and
wind conditions, and over the whole range of uncertain
parameter variations.
In this paper we address the above challenges by proposing
a complete methodology for the design of a dedicated
model based fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) system,
which allows the reliable early detection of OFC charac-
terized by low amplitude oscillations in a given frequency
range. The main factors which contributed to a satisfac-
tory solution of the OFC identification problem are: (1) an
accurate actuator modelling via simple linear parameter-
varying (LPV) models; (2) an improved oscillation detec-
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tion and frequency identification algorithm relying on a re-
cursive formulation of the discrete Fourier transform; and
(3) the integrated optimal tuning of the free parameters of
the FDD system using multi-objective optimization tech-
niques. Additionally, worst-case optimization-based search
is used for robustness assessment of the resulting FDD
system attached to the closed-loop flight control system. In
what follows, we describe more in detail the above aspects
and apply the proposed methodology for the identification
of the OFC for an elevator surface actuator of a civil
aircraft.
2. THE FDD SYSTEM FOR OFC IDENTIFICATION
The FDD system to be used to detect and identify different
OFCs is depicted in Fig. 1, where besides the residual
generator, blocks for residual evaluation, decision making
and fault identification are present. The fault identification
for the OFC involves the determination of the main
characteristics of an oscillatory fault signal f from the
generated residual signal r (e.g., via an estimate of the
oscillation frequency) in the presence of noise signals w(t).
The FDD system structure in Fig. 1 includes a residual
generator for fault detection (or simply, a fault detector),
which processes the commanded actuator position u and
the measured current actuator position y and generates
the scalar residual signal r. For the robust fault detection
considered in this paper, a LPV gain-scheduled detector
will be used, where ρ2 is the vector of scheduling variables
as described in Section 3. The residual evaluation block
computes a specific approximation θ of the residual norm
||r||. This value is used in the decision making block,
where a threshold-based decision logic is employed to
generate the decision signal i, which, if nonzero, triggers a
signal based fault identification process. The output of the
fault identification block is a classification signal c, which
indicates the presence or absence of oscillations. This
Fig. 1. FDD system for OFC monitoring
signal is crucial for triggering an adequate reconfiguration
of the actuation system when the OFC occurs (e.g.,
switching to a backup actuator).
The employed model-based methodology for the design of
the elements of the FDD system in Fig. 1 has the following
main steps:
(1) Development of suitable LPV synthesis models of the
underlying actuator;
(2) Synthesis of LPV residual generators for robust fault
detection;
(3) Setting up of the residual evaluation and decision
making blocks;
(4) Development of signal processing based fault identi-
fication schemes;
(5) The robustness assessment of the FDD system.
In what follows we describe these main steps and present
an application of the proposed OFC identification tech-
niques in the case of a civil aircraft elevator.
3. LPV MODEL GENERATION FOR THE
NONLINEAR ACTUATOR MODEL
In this section we describe the development of a quasi-LPV
approximate model for a system formed from an actuator
and the associated control surface. For the details on the
derivation of the quasi-LPV model see (Varga et al., 2011).
The resulting actuator model has a first order LPV-system
representation of the form
x˙ = −k(ρ)x+ k(ρ)u,
y = x,
(1)
where x and y are the rod position and u is the commanded
position. The gain k(ρ) generally depends on both measur-
able and unmeasurable parameters contained in a vector
ρ. Typical values of the gain are around k0 = 14.
The underlying actuator model is a simplified nonlinear
dynamic model of an hydraulic servo controlled actuator
described by a first order nonlinear state equation of the
form (Goupil, 2010b; Ma´rton and Ossmann, 2012)
x˙ = KciKp(u− x)
√
∆P (x)− Faero(p,x,x˙)+Kdx˙2S
∆Pref
, (2)
where Kp is the servo control gain, Kci is a gain to con-
vert an estimated current to a corresponding rod speed,
∆P is the hydraulic pressure delivered to the actuator,
∆Pref is a differential pressure for a fully opened servo-
valve (maximum rod speed), Faero represents the aerody-
namic forces at the control surface, Kdx˙
2 represents the
estimated servo-control load of the adjacent actuator in
damping mode and S is the actuator piston surface area.
The components of the vector p are the calibrated airspeed
Vcas, the aircraft altitude h, the aircraft mass m and the
position of the center of gravity Xcg along the x-axis.
To get a simple quasi-LPV model approximating (2) with
good accuracy, we approximated the nonlinear gain
K(p, x, x˙) := KciKp
√
∆P (x)− Faero(p,x,x˙)+Kdx˙2S
∆Pref
by an easily computable gain k(p, x, x˙), which is then used
in the first order actuator model as given in (1). The main
variations of K are caused by the aerodynamic force Faero
that acts on the control surface, where Faero itself usually
depends on the parameters in p, the actuator position x
and the sign of the actuator position rate x˙. The effect of
these variations is a reduction or increase of the gain, and
thus variations of the response speed of the actuator.
Physical considerations as described in (Varga et al., 2011)
led to choose k(p, x, x˙) of the form
k(p, x, x˙) = C0(p) + C1(p)sign(x˙)(x+ C2(p)) (3)
where for fixed p, C0(p) can be interpreted as the nominal
gain, C1(p) describes the influence of the deflection angle x
on k, while the factor sign(x˙) allows to distinguish between
upward and downward movements of the control surface.
C2(p) can be interpreted as a position offset. The chosen
functional dependence on x and sign(x˙) reflects the actual
behavior of the actuator dynamics for different control
surface positions and signs of deflection rate. For Ci(p),
i = 0, 1, 2, affine approximations have been used, where
the intervening constant coefficients have been determined
using parameter fitting techniques based on comparing
the output responses of the nonlinear actuator model
(2) and LPV-model (1). The final form of k(ρ), with
ρ = (x, sign(x˙), p) is simple enough to be used in LPV-
model based fault diagnosis applications.
4. SYNTHESIS OF AN LPV RESIDUAL GENERATOR
Assume temporarily that the parameters in ρ are constant.
In this case we can use an input-output representation of
the actuator fault model in the form
y(s) = Gu(s, ρ)u(s) +Gf (s, ρ)f(s), (4)
where y(s), u(s), and f(s) are the Laplace-transformed
quantities of y(t), u(t), and f(t), respectively, and Gu(s, ρ)
and Gf (s, ρ) are the corresponding parameter dependent
transfer functions. Gu(s, ρ) corresponding to (1) is
Gu(s, ρ) =
k(ρ)
s+ k(ρ)
(5)
while Gf (s, ρ) = Gu(s, ρ) for an input located fault
(assumed in this paper). For an output located fault we
can alternatively use Gf (s, ρ) = 1.
Regarding the unknown parameter vector ρ, generally we
can assume that it has two components: ρ1 ∈ Π1, which
is not measurable, and ρ2 ∈ Π2, which is measurable,
and thus ρ ∈ Π := Π1 × Π2. In the case of the elevator
actuator model, if the mass m and center of gravity
position Xcg are not measurable, we can split ρ in ρ1 =
(m,Xcg, δVcas, δh) and ρ2 = (x, sign(x˙), Vcas, h). Here,
δVcas and δh are uncertainties in the measurements of Vcas
and h, respectively. However, if we can assume that m
and Xcg can be estimated with a certain accuracy, then
denoting with δm and δXcg the estimation errors in the
measured m and Xcg, respectively, we can choose ρ1 =
(δm, δXcg, δVcas, δh) and ρ2 = (x, sign(x˙),m,Xcg, Vcas, h).
As residual generator we use a parameter dependent filter
of the form
r(s) = Q(s, ρ2)
[
y(s)
u(s)
]
, (6)
where Q(s, ρ2) is the 1× 2 transfer-function matrix of the
filter, which explicitly depends on the measurable parame-
ter ρ2 (e.g., via an equivalent state-space realization of the
filter). For a physically realizable filter, Q(s, ρ2) must be
robustly stable, having only poles with negative real parts
for all values of ρ2. The robust fault detection synthesis
problem addresses the robustness of the fault detection
system with respect to both the non-measurable parameter
ρ1 and measurable parameter ρ2 by attempting to achieve
robustness using an LPV gain scheduling approach.
To address the robust detection of OFC, we employed the
synthesis method described in (Varga, 2011; Varga et al.,
2011). Assuming all components of ρ entering in the model
(5) are measurable (i.e., ρ2 = ρ), we can use a first order
detector of the form
Q(s, ρ) =
[
a
k0
s+ k(ρ)
s+ a
− k(ρ)a
k0(s+ a)
]
, (7)
where a is an arbitrary positive value specifying the
dynamics of the detector and k0 is a typical nominal value
of the gain k(ρ). By replacing in (6) y(s) by its expression
in (4), we obtain the internal form of the detector
r(s) = Ru(s, ρ)u(s) +Rf (s, ρ)f(s) (8)
where
[Ru(s, ρ) |Rf (s, ρ) ] := Q(s, ρ2)
[
Gu(s, ρ) Gf (s, ρ)
1 0
]
(9)
The choice (7) of Q(s, ρ2) guarantees an exact decoupling
of control inputs in (9), thus Ru(s, ρ) = 0. The correspond-
ing fault-to-residual transfer function is
Rf (s, ρ) =
k(ρ)
k0
a
s+ a
Thus, the residual signal provides a filtered estimation of
the fault, allowing to easily reconstruct the actuator fault
signal f for further use in fault identification.
The LPV state-space realization of the residual generator
(6) can be always obtained in the form
x˙Q(t) = AQxQ(t) +BQ(ρ)
[
y(t)
u(t)
]
r(t) = CQxQ(t) +DQ(ρ)
[
y(t)
u(t)
] (10)
For the detector (7), the state-space matrices are
AQ = −a, BQ(ρ) = a
[
k(ρ)− a
k0
− k(ρ)
k0
]
,
CQ = 1, DQ =
[
a
k0
0
]
.
(11)
The chosen form (7) of the detection filter leads to a state-
space realization with a constant feed-through matrix DQ.
This has the major advantage to prevent all direct effects
on r of the discontinuities in the scheduling signal ρ2 (e.g.,
jumps due to the presence of the signum-function in (3)).
5. SETUP OF RESIDUAL EVALUATION AND
DECISION MAKING BLOCKS
5.1 Residual evaluation
The evaluation of the residual signal often requires the
computation of a measure of the residual signal energy,
for which the 2-norm of the signal is usually an appropri-
ate choice. For this purpose, a so-called Narendra signal
evaluation scheme can be used of the form
θ(t) = α|r(t)|+ β
∫ t
0
e−γ(t−τ)|r(τ)|dτ, (12)
where θ(t) can be generated by the first order differential
equation
ξ˙(t) = −γξ(t) + β|r(t)|
θ(t) = ξ(t) + α|r(t)|, (13)
The filter parameters α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0 are suitable weights
for instantaneous and long-term values, respectively, while
γ > 0 is the forgetting factor.
5.2 Decision making
The evaluation signal θ(t) is compared to a specific thresh-
old Jth in the decision making process to determine the
decision signal i(t) using the decision logic
θ(t) < Jth ⇒ i(t) = 0 ⇒ no fault
θ(t) ≥ Jth ⇒ i(t) = 1 ⇒ fault (14)
The signal θ(t) is ideally equal to zero or sufficiently
small in fault free situations, whereas it shall exceed the
threshold Jth when a fault occurs in the system. Hence, the
appropriate selection of the values of the free parameters
α, β or γ, together with an appropriate threshold Jth
essentially influences the performance of the FDD system.
The setup of the parameters (α, β, γ) of the evaluation
blocks and the threshold Jth used in the decision blocks
must ensure that the requirements regarding typical per-
formance criteria used in the industry as the false alarm
rate (FAR), the missed detection rate (MDR) or the de-
tection time performance (DTP) are fulfilled. A multi-
objective optimization-based parameter tuning approach
aiming the simultaneous minimization of all these quan-
tities can be employed. For the minimization of these
criteria, function evaluations based on extensive simula-
tions of the closed-loop aircraft augmented with an FDD
system are necessary to determine worst-case combina-
tions of unknown external signals (e.g., pilot inputs up,
wind disturbances d) and various parametric uncertain-
ties ρ ∈ Π. Unfortunately, for arbitrary external signals
these function evaluations involving global optimizations
in function spaces are hardly computationally tractable.
To overcome this computational bottleneck, instead of
arbitrary external signals, we used bounded input signals
in given finite classes up ∈ U , d ∈ D and f ∈ F , where
U includes several meaningful pilot maneuvers, D consists
of random wind inputs of given maximum amplitude, and
F includes oscillatory fault signals (liquid and solid) with
given amplitudes and frequencies.
5.3 Determination of detection threshold
The approach used in this paper aims to completely
avoid false alarms and missed detections. For this, for
appropriately chosen values of parameters (α, β, γ) (e.g.,
determined by a preliminary optimization-based tuning)
we determine a value of the decision threshold Jth to
ensure FAR = 0 and MDR = 0.
Consider the false alarm bound defined as
Jfth = sup
ρ ∈ Π
up ∈ U
d ∈ D
f = 0
max
t≤tfin
θ(t) (15)
where tfin is the duration of the maneuvers in U . To avoid
false alarms, the threshold Jth used in the decision block
must be chosen such that Jth > J
f
th.
Similarly, consider the detection bound defined as
Jdth = inf
ρ ∈ Π
up ∈ Uj
d = 0
f ∈ F
max
t≤tdetec
θ(t) (16)
Here, Uj ⊂ U is a subclass of pilot inputs used for a
specific maneuver during which the fault f ∈ F occurs
and has to be detected within a specified detection time
tdetec. To avoid missed detection, the threshold Jth used
in the decision block must be chosen such that Jth < J
d
th.
For the computation of Jfth and J
d
th, solving global worst-
case optimization problems to find the worst-case parame-
ter combinations appears to be the most adequate choice.
However, less demanding computational approaches can
be used, as a gridding based worst-case search over the
flight envelope and parameter space, or Monte-Carlo sim-
ulations, to determine approximations of the upper bound
Jfth and lower bound J
d
th.
A positive detection gap Jdth − Jfth can be interpreted as
a robustness measure of the fault detection performance.
Note that the worst-case parameter combinations resulting
from the computation of Jfth in (15) and J
d
th in (16) are
usually different. If Jdth − Jfth > 0, a constant threshold
Jth satisfying J
d
th ≤ Jth < Jfth can be chosen to guarantee
no false alarms and no missed detections. A choice of Jth
near to Jfth allows in general shorter detection times and
smaller detectable fault amplitudes.
The detection time of a fault f can be determined as
td = min
t≤tfin
{ t | θ(t) > Jth}. (17)
In our study, for an OFC with frequency ω, we target
an overall detection time not larger than three periods
tdetec =
6pi
ω .
6. IDENTIFICATION OF OFC
By using a sufficiently accurate LPV approximation (1)
of the actuator nonlinear model (2) as basis for residual
generator synthesis, the resulting residual signal r will
contain the same oscillatory components as the fault
signal. Once the occurrence of a fault has been detected
using the decision logic (14), the fault identification stage
follows aiming to detect the presence of oscillations in r in
the relevant frequency band. For the identification of OFC,
a signal processing based technique has been proposed
by Goupil (2010b), which involves sub-band filtering of
the residual signal followed by an oscillation counting.
Separate schemes are used to identify liquid and solid
type OFCs. In this section, we describe an alternative
approach, with a sound mathematical basis and which
is easily implementable on-board. The proposed approach
needs no special treatment of different types of OFCs.
A rigorous approach to identify oscillations in noise cor-
rupted signals is the periodogram method (P. Stoica and
R. L. Moses, 1997), which is based on determining the
power spectrum of a signal using the discrete Fourier
transform (DFT). The DFT is easily computable using the
fast Fourier transform (FFT) algorithm and allows a sat-
isfactory accurate evaluation of the oscillation frequency
together with strong statistical guarantee of the presence
of the oscillatory signal. Still, the on-board implementa-
tion of FFT-based frequency analysis is questionable, due
to the strict code certification requirements.
To overcome these limitations, a recursive version of the
DFT, as described in (Morelli, 2000), can be used to detect
oscillations in real-time. Let Ts be the sampling period and
let N be the expected length of the time series r(ti), for
ti = iTs, for i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. The DFT computes
X(ω) :=
N−1∑
i=0
r(ti)e
−jωti
for a given frequency ω. The computation of X(ω) can be
done recursively by defining the partial sum
Yk(ω) =
k∑
i=0
r(ti)e
−jωti
and observing that
Yk(ω) = Yk−1(ω) + r(tk)e−jωtk (18)
for k = 1, . . . , N . Evidently, X(ω) = YN−1(ω), where the
iteration (18) is initialized with Y0(ω) = 0. An oscillation
of frequency nearby to ω is detected at iteration K if
|YK(ω)| > Jth,freq, where Jth,freq is a suitable threshold.
The main appeal of this approach is that usually K  N ,
thus fast detection of the presence of oscillations nearby a
frequency ω is possible.
For the choice of the threshold Jth,freq, we can employ the
expression Jth,freq =
N
2 Jn, where Jn < 1 is a normalized
threshold for unit amplitude sinusoidal signals of frequency
ω. The value of Jn generally accounts for the need to
avoid undetected oscillations of frequency ωx nearby ω.
Recall that the frequency resolution of the DFT for N
samples and a sampling period Ts is
2pi
TsN
, and therefore
the frequency bin around ω contains all frequencies ωx
such that |ωx −ω| ≤ piTsN . The magnitude of the resulting
Fourier coefficient for a unit amplitude sinusoidal signal of
frequency ωx is
|X(ω)| = 1
2
∣∣∣∣ sin[(ωx − ω)NTs/2]sin[(ωx − ω)Ts/2]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ N2
The maximum magnitude drop within a frequency bin
results for ωx = ω ± piTsN as
|X(ω)| = 1
2
1∣∣sin pi2N ∣∣
Since |X(ω)|/(N/2) > 2/pi for all N , we can safely take
Jn = 2/pi a safe threshold for each frequency bin.
Using the above choice for Jn, we can easily determine
the minimum number of frequency values such that the
union of the associated frequency bins covers the relevant
frequency domain. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωM} be the
frequency grid to be chosen with ω1 > ω2 > . . . > ωM .
Each ω` is the midpoint of an interval I(ω`) := [ω`, ω`],
which defines a frequency bin with a resolution of 2piN(ω`)Ts ,
where N(ω`) is the corresponding number of samples (to
be chosen). The choice of these intervals must ensure that
their reunion ∪Mi=1I(ω`) fully covers the relevant frequency
domain for the OFC. A non-overlapping choice is always
possible by imposing ω` = ω`−1, and results by choosing
ω` for ` = 1, 2, . . . ,M according to
ω` =
ω`−1
2
, (19)
where ω0 is the maximum frequency in the relevant fre-
quency domain. N(ω`) can be chosen to satisfy the worst-
case detection time requirement of two periods for the
maximum frequency in the `-th bin ω` = ω`−1, that is,
N(ω`)Ts = 4pi/ω`−1. For this choice, taking into account
(19), we have the simple relations N(ω`) = 2N(ω`−1) be-
tween two successive numbers of samples. For example, us-
ing the above approach, the frequency domain [0.15, 10]Hz
can be covered using a grid of M = 6 frequencies
Ω = 2pi × {7.5, 3.75, 1.875, 0.9375, 0.4687, 0.2343}
and the corresponding values {20, 40, 80, 160, 320, 640} of
N(ω`) for a typical sampling period of Ts = 0.01s.
The recursive algorithm (18) can be implemented effi-
ciently and thus is appealing for real-time applications.
Since usually M  N , we can discard the computations
for N −M frequency values of no interest (which would
be automatically produced when employing the FFT). For
increased efficiency, we can use the precomputed quantities
W (ω) = e−jωTs for each ω ∈ Ω and exploit that
sk := e
−jωtk = W (ω)e−jωtk−1 = W (ω)sk−1 (20)
Thus, at each step k > 2 we have to compute for each
ω ∈ Ω successively
sk = W (ω)sk−1
Yk(ω) = Yk−1(ω) + r(tk)sk
These iterations are initialized with Y1(ω) = r(t0) and
s1 = 1. Taking into account that the intervening r(tk)
in (18) is a real quantity, the number of floating point
operations (flops) to compute Yk(ω) and update sk is 1
complex and 2 real multiplications and 1 complex addition
(equivalent to 6 real multiplications and 2 real additions).
Thus, the operations at each step involve 8M flops. Finally,
we stop iterating if an oscillation has been detected at a
certain iteration kdetec. The total number of operations is
about 8M(kdetec − 1) flops.
7. FDD SYSTEM TUNING AND ASSESSMENT
In this section we describe the application of the method-
ology described in Section 2 to the OFC detection of
an elevator surface controlled by a hydraulic actuator.
The nonlinear actuator model of the elevator is part of
a nonlinear model of a closed-loop aircraft including a
nonlinear control law ensuring robust stability over the
whole flight envelope. For tuning and assessment purposes,
the closed-loop aircraft model has been augmented with an
FDD system as in Fig. 1, which includes the LPV residual
generator determined in Section 4.
For the tuning of the FDD system, the values of the
parameters (α, β, γ) of the residual evaluation block and
the threshold Jth of the decision making block have been
determined by maximizing the detection gap Jdth − Jfth.
The optimal setting with α = 0.85, β = 0.8, γ = 0.08 and
Jth = 0.7 leads to a completely satisfactory fault detection
performance. The signal processing based identification of
the OFC frequency presented in Section 6 is triggered by
the threshold crossing of the evaluation signal θ(t) > Jth.
The robustness of the designed FDD system has been
thoroughly tested for both fault free and faulty situations
in the whole flight envelope and full range of aircraft
parameter variations. To check for the lack of false alarms,
typical maneuvers as for example, piloted flights with
various pilot inputs (longitudinal/lateral stick doublets,
pedal input demand, nose up/nose down demands) or
typical navigation maneuvers (level flight, flight path angle
target mode, yaw angle target mode, speed change, steady
sideslip, coordinated turn, etc.) have been used.
Using optimization-based worst-case search, the normal-
ized detection time
ϑdet = sup
ρ ∈ Π
u ∈ Uj
d ∈ D
f ∈ F
tid − tf
tdetec
(21)
has been used as clearance criterion, where tf is the
time of occurrence of the fault and tid the time of the
identification of OFC. A maximum value above 1 of this
criterion indicates a violation of the required detection
time tdetec.
A typical fault-free maneuver is depicted in Fig. 2, where
the actuator output y follows almost instantly the de-
manded signal u. The generated residual r is corrupted
only by the measurement noise in y, which is also present
in the evaluation signal θ. This however remains below the
threshold Jth, indicating no fault.
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Fig. 2. Example for fault free maneuvering
Fig. 3 illustrates the occurrence of a liquid OFC with a
frequency of 0.5Hz (i.e., ω = pi) in the actuator output y
at tf . The visible difference between u and y indicates that
the residual signal has likely an oscillatory behavior. In-
deed, the evaluation signal θ increases rapidly and crosses
the threshold Jth at td, when the fault is detected. The
signal based fault identification indicates at tid that the
value |Yk(pi)| of the power spectral density of the residual
becomes larger than the threshold Jth,freq. In this example
the total detection time of the OFC is tid − tf = 2.6 sec-
onds, of which td− tf = 0.4 seconds are required to detect
the occurrence of a fault and tid − td = 2.2 seconds to
identify it. Thus, only 1.3 periods of the targeted 3 periods
are necessary to identify this OFC.
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Fig. 3. Detection and identification of an OFC
To assess the global performance of the FDD system for
the detection of the OFC, the worst-case normalized de-
tection time ϑdet defined in (21) has been determined for
several OFC situations in a cruise flight. Recall that the
specific choice of the threshold Jth described in subsection
5.3 already guarantees the fulfillment of all requirements
regarding the lack of false alarms and missed detections, as
well as satisfactory detection times. Thus, the performed
worst-case analysis only provides supplementary informa-
tion on the overall robustness of the detection time perfor-
mance of the FDD system. The worst-case analysis results
for three liquid and three solid OFCs for the frequencies
0.5Hz, 1.5Hz, and 7Hz are listed in Table 1. As it can be
observed, the normalized detection times tend to increase
with the frequency, which indicates that the detection of
OFC at higher frequencies appears to be more challenging
for the proposed method.
Table 1. Worst-case analysis results
OFC Type OFC frequency tdetec tid − tf ϑdet
Liquid 0.5Hz 6s 3.72s 0.62
Solid 0.5Hz 6s 3.54s 0.59
Liquid 1.5Hz 2s 1.36s 0.68
Solid 1.5Hz 2s 1.26s 0.63
Liquid 7Hz 0.42s 0.34s 0.82
Solid 7Hz 0.42s 0.32s 0.75
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed a model-based synthesis, tuning
and assessment methodology for the development of an
FDD system for the early detection of OFC for aircraft
actuators. The main features of the proposed approach,
which confer a superior performance compared to existing
approaches, are: (1) relying on accurate LPV models allow-
ing high performance detector synthesis; (2) application
of advanced synthesis methods of LPV residual generators
guaranteeing robust and fast fault detection; (3) employing
an integrated optimization-based tuning of the parameters
of the fault evaluation and decision making blocks, includ-
ing the determination of detection thresholds, to guarantee
no false alarms and no missed detections; (5) employing
theoretically sound, but still real-time implementable fault
identification method; and (6) employing worst-case search
based on global-optimization for robustness assessment.
An important aspect to mention is that while the synthesis
of the LPV residual generator relies on a fault monitoring
approach at component (actuator) level, the tuning of the
overall FDD system parameters and the final robustness
analysis involve the closed-loop aircraft. The proposed
methodology has been successfully applied for the design of
an FDD system for the identification of the solid and liquid
OFCs of an elevator actuator. The strong requirements
for no false alarms, no missed detections and short fault
detection times have been completely fulfilled in the pres-
ence of parametric uncertainties over the whole range of
envelope values and of significant parametric uncertainties
and measurement noise.
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